Against Strong Concept Empiricism
- Suppose that all of our concepts are derived from sensory experience; specifically, suppose that we acquire the concept C by identifying similarities among diverse experiences of instances of C and generalizing on the relevant feature common to all of them (viz., C-ness). [Premise – cf. 74c]
- One of our concepts is similarity. [Premise]
- So if (1) is true, we acquire the concept of similarity by identifying similarities among cases of similarity and generalizing on the relevant feature common to all of them (viz., similarity). [1, 2]
- But (3) is absurd: the acquisition of a particular concept can’t presuppose possession of that very concept. [Premise]
- Therefore, (1) is false: some of our concepts are not so acquired. [1, 4]
The Argument from Imperfection
- Whenever we judge that some perceptible object is equal (to another), larger, smaller, beautiful, good, just, pious, etc., we judge that it is only imperfectly so. [Premise]
- If one judges that a perceptible object is only imperfectly F, she must have in mind something that is perfectly F to which she compares it and recognizes it to fall short of in terms of F-ness. [Premise]
- So we often have in mind something that is perfectly F. [1, 2]
- So there is something such that it is perfectly F and we have it in mind [3]
- So there is something that is perfectly F. [4]
- But no perceptible object is perfectly F. [Premise]
- Hence, there is something that is perfectly F (call it the “Form of F-ness”), distinct from any perceptible object, in comparison to which we judge perceptible objects to be imperfectly F. [5, 6]
[Corollary: Since we cannot have come to have the Form of F-ness in mind by experiencing any perceptible object (see (6)), we must have it in mind due to experiencing the Form itself in some prenatal state of existence.]