Skip to main content

The Protagoras

Toward the “Unity of Virtues”

  1. Folly is opposed to wisdom. [Premise—cf. 332a]
  2. Foolish behavior is opposed to temperate behavior. [Premise—cf. 332b]
  3. Foolish behavior is a result of folly. [Premise—cf. 332b]
  4. Temperate behavior is a result of temperance. [Premise—cf. 332b]
  5. If x and y are opposing types of behavior, they are the result of opposing types of character traits. [Premise—cf. 332c]
  6. So folly is opposed to temperance. [2, 3, 4, 5]
  7. Anything that stands in a relation of opposition has exactly one opposite. [Premise—cf. 332d]
  8. Hence, wisdom = temperance. [1, 6, 7—cf. 333b]

Against the Possibility of Incontinence (akrasia—weakness of will)

  1. x is bad iff x’s net result is greater pain than pleasure. [Premise—cf. 354d]
  2. Suppose that the following is possible: S knows that x is bad, but does x anyway, having been overcome by the pleasure that attends x. [Premise—for the purpose ofreductio ad absurdum]
  3. On this hypothesis, S knows that x’s net result is greater pain than pleasure, but S does x anyway, having been overcome by the pleasure that attends x. [1, 2]
  4. An individual can be overcome by pleasure only if pleasure outweighs pain; that is, if there is more pleasure than pain. [Premise—cf. 355d ff.]
  5. But then it’s impossible that S should be overcome by the pleasure that attends x when x is, by hypothesis, bad. [3, 4]
  6. Therefore, the supposition in (2) is impossible. [5]